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While all eyes are set on the 
formal opening of the EU 
membership talks with Serbia on 
21 January 2014, this policy brief 
explores the prospects for 
Belgrade’s closer cooperation 
with NATO. While the EU’s 
accession process is the force 
majeure dominating current 
political and economic 
development in the Western 
Balkans, the regional security 
architecture is still based on 
NATO. EU and NATO integration 
are still considered as mutually 
reinforcing processes. The main 
focus in Serbia has shifted to 
“soft security” issues such as rule 
of law, justice affairs and fight 
against corruption, where the EU 
is in the driving seat.  
NATO’s continuous engagement 
in the region has been vital for 
substantial progress in defence 
reforms, regional cooperation 
among national armed forces, 
and the increasing degree of 
security ownership among 
Balkan countries. This applies, 
above all, to Serbia and Kosovo. 
Their April 2013 agreement 
opened the door to the  
 
integration of the Serb-
dominated northern part of 
Kosovo under Pristina’s 
jurisdiction - a huge step forward 
for regional peace and security. 
Brokered by EU High 
Representative Catherine 
Ashton, it has also indirectly 
strengthened the NATO’s role 
(through its KFOR mission) to 
provide overall security on the 
ground as this historic deal is 
being implemented. In fact, 
Belgrade’s leadership specifically 
requested KFOR’s involvement, 
as it deems it is the only military 
protection of the Kosovo Serbs. 
By this, KFOR has become 
security guarantor of the April 
agreement. Serbia strongly 
objects to KFOR phase-out plans 
and hopes that NATO will stay 
engaged there in a long term. 
What does it all mean for 
Serbia’s relations with the 
Alliance? What are the realistic 
prospects to intensify their 
practical cooperation and 
political relationship this year? To 
what extent is it linked with 
Serbia’s accession talks with the 
EU? 
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Partners, not enemies 
anymore  
Serbia is certainly the most complicated but also 
one of the most relevant NATO partners in the 
region. It is the only Balkan country which is neither 
a NATO member nor interested in becoming one 
in the near future. Officially, Belgrade’s declared 
goal is military neutrality. 
Serbia’s relations with NATO have been 
continuously haunted by the legacy of the NATO 
bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 over 
Kosovo. The Alliance is still hugely unpopular in the 
country [1]. This puts a limit on the Serbian 
politicians’ ability to publicly acknowledge the 
real extent and character of the country’s 
evolving partnership with NATO. 
On the other hand, as the largest and centrally 
located Balkan country with the largest 
professional army in the Western Balkans, Serbia 
needs to work closely with NATO to protect its 
interests, modernise its armed forces, and to 
increase its international profile as a reliable 
partner and security provider. Another crucial 
factor is geography: all of Serbia’s neighbours are 
either NATO members (Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia) or aspire to join the Alliance in 
the near future (Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina). Belgrade even supports the 
NATO membership bids of its three neighbours, 
and seeks the inter-operability of its 
defence systems with those of NATO members 
and candidates. 
In 2006, Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace 
programme (PfP) becoming a NATO’s partner 
country. Belgrade thus gained access to a 
number of NATO Committees as well as to its 
programmes, and became eligible to get support 
from a range of NATO Funds. It has also joined the 
Planning and Review Process (PARP), which is the 
basic tool within the PfP through which the 
partners can reform their armed forces, adopt 
NATO standards and achieve higher 
interoperability. On its part, NATO opened 
its Military Liaison Office in Belgrade and pledged 
to support Serbia in achieving its Partnership 
goals.  
Over time, political and military cooperation 
between NATO and Serbia have evolved with 
varying speed and intensity. Serbian defence 
reforms and modernisation of its armed forces 
(SAF) have been carried out with NATO’s advice 
and assistance. Selected SAF units [2] have 
already been certified according to NATO’s 
standards, achieving increased inter-operability 
for potential deployments in international crisis 
management operations. Besides Serbia - NATO 
Defence Reform Group set up by embassies of 
several members in Belgrade, the Alliance has 
been active and visible in Serbia through 
several Trust Funds covering projects addressing 
several pressing military safety issues (such as 
liquidation of land mines and, most recently, 
surplus ammunition) and implemented several 
projects under the Science for Peace and Security 
Programme, and Public Diplomacy grants.  
The key subject in the Serbia-NATO dialogue has 
been Kosovo. Serbia’s leaders have vowed never 
to recognise its independence. The NATO-led 
KFOR mission is responsible for Kosovo’s security. 
On the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 
no. 1244, KFOR is mandated to ensure a safe and 
secure environment, including freedom of 
movement to all people in Kosovo. In effect, it 
means that KFOR protects the ethnic Serb minority 
and religious places in the enclaves to the south 
of the Ibar River. On this basis, Belgrade and SAF 
have been developing constructive relations with 
KFOR, including simultaneous and coordinated 
patrols along the administrative border. On the 
other hand, Belgrade continues to view with 
suspicion KFOR’s assistance in developing the 
Kosovo Security Force (KSF). 
Serbia’s involvement in PfP was put on hold in 
early 2008 as a reaction to Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence, which was actively supported 
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by the United States and most (although not all) 
NATO members. It was resumed one year later. 
Serbia appointed its first Ambassador to NATO - 
Branislav Milinković, and opened its mission at the 
NATO HQ in Brussels in 2010. A few months later, 
the North Atlantic Council approved Serbia’s 
request to develop its first Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP) defining its defence reform 
goals and areas for intensified bilateral 
cooperation for the next two years. Under the 
IPAP, more political consultations and practical 
cooperation were to take place. Once adopted, 
the IPAP will upgrade the nature of existing co-
operation from purely military to a political one.  
In the 2011 - 2012 period, bilateral relations with 
NATO were gradually gaining momentum. The 
Serbian President Tadić, himself a former minister 
of defence (MoD), had been supportive of 
moving Serbia closer to NATO. At the same time, 
he was extremely careful and ambiguous about 
this issue in public, unwilling to challenge the 
official doctrine of military neutrality. His MoD 
Dragan Šutanovac was more outspoken in public, 
explaining that Serbia and NATO are not enemies 
anymore, but partners seeking the best models of 
cooperation [3]. At times, Šutanovac seemed 
frustrated with the lack of political mandate and 
unity within the government in terms of what 
Serbia really wants to achieve in its relations with 
NATO. By the end of his tenure, the Serbian 
Ministry of Defence was using the full toolbox of 
existing programmes developing a substantive 
track record of bilateral cooperation. In 2012 
alone, 119 military and expert activities were 
implemented (out of 151 planned). At the same 
time, the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
careful to note that all of the activities were in line 
with Serbia's doctrine of military neutrality [4], 
while actively using diplomatic channels to 
develop the political side of this relationship (at 
lower levels of officials). 
 
Reluctance to develop 
political dialogue  
This trajectory was interrupted by the change of 
governments in Belgrade. In May 2012, Serbian 
President Boris Tadić lost elections to the 
nationalist candidate Tomislav Nikolić. In parallel, 
his Democratic Party was replaced in the 
government by the Nikolić’s Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS), which used to be openly critical 
about Serbia’s cooperation with NATO and whose 
voter constituency is instinctively anti-NATO. Under 
its current leader, the powerful first Deputy Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić, the SNS has been the 
backbone of the coalition government with the 
smaller Socialist Party, whose leader Ivica Dačić 
managed to secure the premiership. When the 
new government came to power in mid-2012, 
there was general expectation that quiet drive 
towards closer relations with NATO would go into 
reverse. That has clearly not happened. The 
biggest break-through has been on Kosovo. 
Under EU facilitation (and with tough 
conditionality on starting the EU accession talks), 
the Dačić government has made huge progress 
in political dialogue with Kosovo, and sought 
security guarantees from NATO for gradual 
integration of four Serb-dominated municipalities 
into Kosovo’s legal system.  
In the meantime, a more nuanced picture has 
emerged vis-à-vis NATO, with the following 
elements:  
 There is now more reluctance in Belgrade 
to develop a political dialogue with the 
Alliance than two years ago. This was 
confirmed at the formal meeting between 
Serbian President Nikolić with NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen on the side-
lines of the UN General Assembly in New 
York in September 2013. It mostly focused 
on KFOR and situation in Kosovo. As for 
bilateral cooperation, Secretary General 
Rasmussen underlined that NATO is ready 
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to expand practical military cooperation 
and political dialogue with Serbia step by 
step. In his press statement, President 
Nikolić hinted that Serbia is open to more 
cooperation but at the same time, it 
“would not like to choose sides” and 
prefers to keep political distance from the 
Alliance. [5]   
 
 This has been accompanied by a clear 
shift in political rhetoric. Previous talk of 
moving towards a closer partnership with 
NATO in Belgrade is gone. For most of 
2013, the Serbian government has focused 
on getting the green light to start the EU 
accession talks. Its leaders tried hard to 
explain the fulfilment of tough EU 
conditionality on Kosovo to the public as a 
necessary concession that will bring long-
term benefits for Serbia, and save it from 
economic collapse. That is one more 
reason why Serbian leaders have been 
more careful to go against public 
sentiment in other sensitive foreign policy 
and security issues, including closer 
cooperation with NATO. President Nikolić, 
in particular, has repeatedly emphasised 
military neutrality as the key political 
guideline in relations with NATO. At the 
same time, however, Serbia has continued 
to develop its practical cooperation with 
the Alliance, albeit with less enthusiasm for 
political dialogue than before.  
 
 Vučić (who until August 2013 also held the 
position of MoD) has been trying to 
balance developing cooperation with 
NATO by intensified political and military 
contacts with Russia, including in arms 
procurement. Earlier in 2013, Serbia 
became an observer at the Moscow-led 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation. 
However, the current level of Serbia-NATO 
cooperation remains significantly greater 
than the level of military cooperation with 
Moscow. In November 2013, Vučić tried 
hard to fend off concerns of the visiting 
Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, 
over continuous cooperation with NATO 
and assured him that Serbia’s goal is not to 
join the Alliance [6].  
 
 All programs of military-technical 
cooperation between Serbia and NATO 
are still moving ahead (up to 160 activities 
were planned for 2013), and even new 
ones are being started. In July 2013, a new 
Trust Fund led by the United Kingdom was 
launched to assist the SAF to liquidate 
decommissioned surplus ammunition [7]. It 
is being implemented in the Technical 
Overhaul Institute Kragujevac (KRZK). In 
parallel, the pace of security sector 
reforms at the Ministry of Defence is 
slowing down. But rather than a result of 
political decisions, it might well be just a 
side effect of two issues: the change of 
personnel and more limited financial 
resources on both sides. Cuts in defence 
cooperation programs of NATO member 
countries also played a role in slight 
reduction of new activities. 
On the other hand, the IPAP – as the key guideline 
for bilateral cooperation – has yet to be finalised. 
It is important to note that the current Serbian 
government decided to submit its updated 
version to the North Atlantic Council last year. The 
new IPAP draft has been bouncing back and 
forth among involved government institutions in 
Belgrade, and between Serbia and NATO. Now it 
has reached the final stages of the formal 
approval procedure, set to be adopted in early 
2014. The main areas of future Serbia - NATO 
cooperation have been envisaged as follows: 
political and security framework; defence and 
military issues; public diplomacy, scientific 
cooperation, crisis management and emergency 
planning system and the protection of classified 
information. 
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This leads to an impression that as NATO is 
interested to see a gradual build-up of strong 
relationship, the current Serbian leadership is 
divided over this issue. In particular, the SNS 
leadership has been reluctant to move beyond 
the status quo. As Serbian politics is wheeling up 
for snap parliamentary election in 2014, this year 
might bring not only formal advancement of the 
Serbia - NATO cooperation but perhaps also a 
more ambitious Minister of Defence allowed to 
come up with creative ideas about how to move 
this quiet partnership forward.  
Conclusions 
 In 2014, NATO should encourage Belgrade 
to deliver on tangible short-term steps 
palatable to the public opinion and 
coalition parties constituencies, such as 
nominating a new Serbian ambassador to 
NATO (after the tragic death of 
Ambassador Milinković, his job has been 
vacant for more than a year). It is very 
likely that Serbia will first enter the EU (in 
2020 at the earliest) and only then decide 
about its potential membership in 
NATO. However, in the meantime it will 
need to develop practical vision of how to 
use its relationship with NATO for strategic 
advancement of Serbia’s role in 
international security and military missions 
out of Europe. Hopes are that the first IPAP 
might be approved and its 
implementation started in 2014. 
 The new momentum in Serbia’s 
cooperation with NATO could be 
generated by the EU accession talks, since 
it will also include the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) agenda. 
Relevant Serbian state institutions – the 
Ministry of Defence in particular – are 
already mapping what changes will be 
required. Practical needs for growing 
interoperability with the EU partners (while 
most of them are also in NATO) might result 
in a new push for modernisation of Serbian 
army as well as in a dramatic increase in 
Serbian military personnel participation in 
international peace-keeping operations 
under the EU or UN flag. Currently, Serbia is 
involved in number of UN missions as well 
as the EU’s counter-piracy naval force 
operation Atalanta around Somalia and its 
medical team has been part of the EUTM 
training mission in Somalia.  
 In Kosovo, the international security set-up 
might soon undergo major changes as the 
EULEX’s mandate expires in June 2014, and 
its renewal by the Kosovo government is 
far from certain. As the security situation 
continues to improve, some NATO 
members advocate for an additional 
KFOR troop reductions and scaling down 
its duties to prepare for future withdrawal 
from Kosovo (under the so-called Gate 3 
option). By mid-2014, 300 French soldiers 
will leave KFOR as decided by the French 
President Holland at the end of the last 
year. Serbia strongly rejects the Gate 3 
option and would like to see KFOR troops 
remaining at the current levels even after 
the announced French withdrawal. If 
Pristina gets its way and the EULEX’s role is 
set to diminish, it will be more difficult for 
some NATO members to argue for further 
KFOR troop reductions. Such development 
could strengthen political dialogue 
between Belgrade and NATO on Kosovo.  
 In terms of public diplomacy, it is time for a 
new discourse with more realism“message 
constituency”, and long-term approach. 
As shown during the recent “Partnership 
Tour” co-organised by the Slovak Atlantic 
Commission and the Atlantic Council of 
Serbia in towns across the country, more 
attention needs to be turn to the 
significance of NATO in providing security 
for the Serbian community in Kosovo, aid 
in reforming the Serbian Armed Forces, 
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and to the recent experience of the new NATO members. The Alliance is doing a lot of partnership activities 
in Serbia which make a real difference and help both Serbian Armed Forces as well as civilians. Serbia 
belongs to one of the most active NATO partners in Building Integrity Initiative aimed at fighting corruption in 
the defence sector as well as implementation of the UN SC Resolution No. 1325 on gender equality in armed 
forces.   However, these activities are not publicised effectively in Serbia and very little is known about them 
outside of Belgrade. NATO as well as Serbia could do more in informing the public about their joint projects 
and activities.  
--- 
1) According to IPSOS data, only 13% of Serbian population supports the idea of Serbia joining NATO. It is mostly supported by young 
people under 30, and by men more than women. See more at: http://www.bezbednost.org/BCSP-News/5212/SerbiaNATO-Time-is-Ripe-
for-a-Change-in.shtml#sthash.Ue1MuPdv.dpuf  
2) Serbia is using the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) mechanism within the PfP, which offers tools for self-evaluation as well as 
teams of evaluators from NATO. Serbia has pre-declared the following units into the OCC: Motorised Infantry Company, Military Police 
Platoon and NBC Platoon. These units have already been certified through the 2nd Self-evaluation stage (June 2013), and expect to 
be certified for the highest level of preparedness (NEL 2) in September 2014. However, due to political limitations, Serbia is preparing 
these units for missions under the UN and EU mandates, without outlook for their deployment within NATO-led operations in the near 
future.  
3) Tanjug, 5.2.2010. See: http://english.blic.rs/News/5982/Sutanovac-NATO-not-enemy-any-more 
4) http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/foreign-policy/security-issues/partnership-for-peace-programme 
5) B92, 27.9.2013. See:  http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=09&dd=27&nav_id=87803 
6) B92,14.11.2013. See: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=88337  
7) www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50100.htm Note: Except for the NATO member countries also Partner nations (i.e. non-NATO 
members) have donated additional funds to the Trust fund for liquidation of the surplus ammunition (e.g. Switzerland 98.000 EUR, Ireland 
80.000 EUR as of the end of November 2013. 
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